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A Bird's.-eye View of Changes in the
Ohio Law of Commercial Paper and
Banking Practice
Loren E. Souers, Jr.
In some respects, the newly adopted Uniform Commercial Code rep-
resents evolution, by reason of its revision and up-dating of existing
statutory law. This holds true for Chapter 1303 of the Ohio Revised
Code (article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code), since this chapter
supplants the old Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. In other re-
spects, the new Code has the aspect of revolution, since it presents a
wholly new codification in a field never before given uniform statutory
treatment. Chapter 1304 of
the Ohio Revised Code (article
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Denison University, 4 of the Uniform Commercial
LL.B., Western Reserve University) is a prac- Code), which deals with bank
ticing attorney in Canton, Ohio. He is a mem-
ber of the Banking and Commercial Law Corn- deposits and collections, is an
mittee of the Ohio State Bar Association and example of this.
has lectured extensively on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. This article will attempt to
point out the most significant
changes in both of these fields
from the standpoint of the practitioner, leaving the more academic ques-
tions to be treated by others.
The order of consideration will be generally the same as the nu-
merical order of the chapters and sections of the Ohio Revised Code,
except where a close relation of separated sections dictates otherwise.
However, since most commercial paper flows through banks, at times
there will be cross-references between these two chapters due to the
mutual impingement of their subject matter.
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Definitions and Formal Requisites
Among the definitions in article 3,1 the only significant change from
existing law is that which provides that an "order" may be addressed
"to one or more such persons jointly or in the alternative."'  No such
provision permitting alternative drafts existed under the Uniform Nego-
1. The Uniform Commercial Code will be referred to throughout the text by the article
numbers.
2. OHIO REv. CoDE § 1303.01(A) (2), UCC § 3-102(1) (b).
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tiable Instruments Law, nor was there any specific prohibition upon
such form of draft.3 The practical result of this is to give statutory
approval to the practice of some large corporations whereby dividend
checks are drawn upon banks in various parts of the country in the
alternative, thus aiding early bank clearance. Similarly, corporate em-
ployers having plants at widely separated locations may now conveniently
use the same paycheck form for all employees by naming banks in all
plant locations as alternative drawees.4
Unconditional Promise
As under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Code identi-
fies commercial paper by its adherence to certain specified form and
approved language. The first required element of negotiability under
article 3 is that the paper "contain an unconditional promise or order."'
Here, the Uniform Commercial Code has introduced several interesting
new exceptions to the old rule of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. Formerly, a promise or order was deemed conditional only if it
was to be paid out of a particular fund and was not drawn on the gen-
eral credit of the maker or drawer. This "particular fund" limitation of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law caused unfortunate results in
some cases, and two of these are corrected by the new Code in section
3-105."
For instance, in many cases certain municipal, school, and other
public obligations may legally be paid only from the proceeds of specific
levies or assessments and may not become general charges upon the
government issuing them.7 Under the "particular fund" doctrine of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, such notes, warrants, bonds, and
similar public obligations have usually been held to be non-negotiable.
Also, under the same rule, partnerships and other unincorporated business
associations have in the past been unable to limit the obligation on their
paper solely to the assets of the business entity, excluding liability of the
individual partners or members, without destroying negotiability. This,
of course, put them at a practical disadvantage in comparison with corpo-
rations, yet the basis for the distinction was too nebulous to be sensible.
Now, however, under subsections (g) and (h) of section 3-105,
the Code makes certain specific exceptions to the "particular fund" doc-
trine by permitting negotiability to attach to orders limited to payment
3. See former O-no REV. CoDE § 1305.04, 95 Ohio Laws 188 (1902).
4. 1 ANDmsoN, UN oR CoMmcrAL CODE 494, comment 3 (1961).
5. Omo REv. CoDE 5 1303.03(A) (2), UCC § 3-104(1) (b).
6. Ot-o REv. CoDE 5 1303.04.
7. Note recognition of this rule and avoidance of its effect in Carron v. Little, 40 Ohio St.
397 (1884).
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"out of a particular fund or the proceeds of a particular source" where
the paper is issued by a governmental entity, and "out of the entire assets
of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or estate" where such
entity is the issuing party.
Sum Certain
The next requirement of negotiable paper under the Code is that the
order or promise be for the payment of "a sum certain."8  It had long
been assumed, though without specific statutory approval under the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law, that an increase in interest rates after
default (or other specified event), or a discount for early payment, or an
addition or penalty for late payment would not be violative of the pro-
visions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law so as to destroy
negotiability. Now, however, legislative sanction is specifically given
to such common provisions by section 3-106 subsections (1) (b), (1)
(c), and (1) (d).'
Thus, language such as the following now has statutory approval
and may be used without fear of loss of negotiability:
... interest to be payable at the rate of 5 percent per annum on all
monthly balances, until January 2, 1964, and thereafter at the rate of
6 percent per annum. If not paid in full eight years from the date
hereof, undersigned agrees to pay a premium of $25.00 for each $1,000
or part thereof then remaining unpaid, to be added to principal and to
bear interest from such date; but in the event this note shall be fully
paid within five years from date, then the undersigned shall receive a
discount of principal in the amount of $15.00 for each $1,000.00 or part
thereof remaining due at the time of final payment.
Naturally, few notes would contain all of these provisions, but apparently
none of them, nor any clauses of similar import, would affect nego-
tiability under the new law.
One word of warning, however, should be given under another sub-
division of this section. Section 3-106(1) (e)"o states that no provision
for recovering "costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both" will affect
the statement of a "sum certain." It would not be unreasonable for many
lawyers to jump to the conclusion that, contrary to the long-held but
lamented rule in Ohio, this provision now approves the collection of
attorney's fees from the debtor as one of the permissible costs of collec-
tion. They would be well advised to consider the language of sub-
section (2) of section 3-106," for this states that "nothing in this section
shall validate any term which is otherwise illegal." Although perhaps
8. OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.03 (A) (2), UCC § 3-104(1) (b).
9. OmIo REv. CODE 5 1303.05 (A) (2), (A) (3), and (A) (4).
10. OHIO REV. CODE 5 1303.05 (A) (5).
11. Omo REV. CODE § 1303.05 (B).
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most obviously directed at provisions designed to collect usurious interest
after default, it would seem clear that in Ohio this provision also keeps
in effect the rule of Miller v. Kyle,'" holding that although a clause
allowing collection of attorney's fees as a cost of collection will not
affect negotiability, it will nevertheless not be enforced, being contrary
to public policy. Many Ohio lawyers have no doubt taken the rule of
the Miller case to stand for the proposition that it is also against public
policy for lawyers to eat, but nevertheless it apparently is still the law.
Definite Time
As in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, an instrument is
only negotiable if "payable at a definite time,"'" or on demand. How-
ever, the new Code has made some substantial changes in the meaning
of "definite time," both by deletion and by addition.
The first instance of addition to the old rules is a provision for
payment "at a definite time subject to any acceleration."'4 (Emphasis
added.) Under this provision, a promise to pay "ninety days from date,
or at such time as the holder may deem his security to be insecure" is
payable at a definite time. This may appear to be no more than a
promise to pay on demand, but no later than ninety days from date. If
this were so, it would still give the necessary certainty of time for pay-
ment, since it contains a stated time limit as a term note, as well as
having the basic characteristic of a demand note. However, the fact
is that such a clause does not give a totally uncontrolled right of accelera-
tion to a holder. Section 1-208"5 requires of a holder a good faith be-
lief that his prospect of payment is in fact impaired, although it places
the burden of proving lack of good faith upon the one against whom
the right is exercised.
The other three added provisions, found in the same section, permit:
(1) a definite time "subject to extension at the option of the holder,"
(2) a definite time subject "to extension to a further definite time at the
option of the maker or acceptor," and (3) a definite time subject to
further extension "automatically upon or after a specified act or event."
The first of these only gives to a holder the unlimited power of ex-
tension he would always have had, but since only he can exercise such
power, the time for payment remains sufficiently certain. However, as
to the latter two changes, where the power of extension is in a maker
or acceptor, or is automatic, the time for extension must be limited to
a definite time, so as to afford certainty to the holder.
12. 85 Ohio St. 186, 97 NE. 372 (1911).
13. Omo REv. CODE § 1303.08, UCC § 3-109.
14. OHio REV. CODE3 § 1303.08(A) (3), UCC § 3-109(1) (c).
15. Omio REv. CODE § 1301.14.
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Thus, if the power of extension is in a holder, the instrument may
promise to pay "120 days after date, or at such later date as the holder
may specify before maturity" without affecting negotiability. A similar
clause, however, specifying "maker," instead of "holder," would be
objectionable; but the following would assure negotiability: "120 days
after date, or thirty days thereafter if, before maturity, the maker shall
give notice thereof." Likewise, a note payable "six months from date,
or in event of my father's death before maturity, then nine months after
such event," will qualify as having a date certain. Such an instrument
is definite as to time by reason of having a maximum date for payment,
to wit: one day less than fifteen months.
This latter rule leads naturally to consideration of the deletion
change. Formerly, payment was considered certain if required to occur
at a fixed time after an event certain to occur, even though the time of
occurrence might be uncertain. Thus, "payable six months after my
father's death" was formerly permissible. Now, such language would
destroy negotiability. It has been suggested,'6 however, that substantially
the same result may be obtained by taking advantage of the "any ac-
celeration" clause, stating a definite time far in the future, with accelera-
tion to occur upon happening of an event certain to occur at an inde-
terminate date, as: "payable 90 years from date, but to be accelerated by
my father's death so as to become due six months after his death."
Silly as such post-obituary provisions may appear, there is sometimes
a real desire by a borrower to use such language so as to provide for pay-
ment after receipt of an inheritance. Hence, a word of caution should
be given due to the deliberate deletion of the language of section 4(3)
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the official comment
indicating an intention to reverse the old rule. It should be recognized
that although the exact language of the new rule does not expressly
outlaw circumvention in the manner suggested by Hawkland and Ander-
son, a court might well read the intent and spirit of the change as pro-
hibiting such obvious subterfuge.
Words of Negotiability
As in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Code requires
words of negotiability, such as "order," "bearer," ".cash," and variations
of these." The former law, however, permitted the use of what were
generally called "words of similar import," by reason of a statement in
section 10 of that law approving any terms "which clearly indicate an in-
16. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER 16 (A.L.I. 1959); 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 518, n.4 (1961).
17. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1303.09-.10, UCC §§ 3-110 to -111.
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tendon to conform to the requirements hereof." This loophole had per-
mitted many courts to interpret varying language importing negotiability
as broadly, or as narrowly, as the judges deemed proper, causing great
disparity and confusion from one jurisdiction to another.
The Code omits such an approval of other words importing nego-
tiability. In fact, section 3-10418 dearly says that in order for any
instrument to be negotiable under article 3, it "must ...be payable
to order or to bearer." This must be seasoned with two grains of salt,
however, namely, section 3-110(1) 1" and the official comment to the
Code. The former states than an instrument "is payable to order when
by its terms it is payable to the order or assigns of any person," as well
as if "conspicuously designated on its face as 'exchange' or the like," thus
approving the variant words, "assigns" and "exchange." (Emphasis
added.) Moreover, the official comment to section 3-104 dearly states
an intention to include terms "clearly the equivalent of another."2
At this point, attention should be drawn to the word "conspicuously"
appearing in section 3-110(1). For an understanding of this, reference
must be had to section 1-201(10)?1 A term is there defined as being
"cconspicuous" if printed or written in capitals, in larger or contrasting
type, or in a different color from the other printing or writing. Hence,
mere use of the word "exchange" or the like will not suffice; the word
used must also be conspicuous.
Section 3-110 also adopts a rule which amounts to a specific reversal
of an Ohio case regarding certificates of deposit. The new law states
that an instrument not otherwise payable to order "is not made so pay-
able by such words as 'payable upon return of this instrument properly
indorsed.' "22 An Ohio court of appeals had at one time held that a
bank's certificate of deposit bearing such words was a proper negotiable
instrument, the words meaning, as the court said, "payable to the de-
positor, or to her order."'
Requiring Acts Other Than Payment
Just as there had always been some doubt under the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law as to whether a note or bill might include pro-
visions for premiums for late payment, discounts for early payment, and
changes of interest rates, 4 there had also been doubt as to whether the
18. Omo REv. CODE 5 1303.03 (A) (4).
19. OHIo REV. CODE § 1303.09(A).
20. UCC 5 3-104, comment 5.
21. OHIo REV. CODE § 1301.01(J).
22. OHIo REV. CODE § 1303.09(B), UCC § 3-110(2).
23. Felton v. Commerdal Natl Bank, 39 Ohio App. 24, 177 N.E. 52 (1930).
24. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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lender could legally provide for requiring additional collateral and auto-
matic acceleration upon failure to give such added security. Now, how-
ever, such doubts as were caused by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law prohibition against requiring the doing of any act besides the pay-
ment of money have been eliminated by section 3-112.25 This section
specifically permits "a promise or power to maintain or protect col-
lateral or to give additional collateral." As has been seen above, section
3-10926 permits acceleration for any reason. Hence, language like the
following:
In the event the Bank shall deem said collateral insufficient and give
notice thereof, I agree to assign further collateral to the Bank's satisfac-
tion within 48 hours, and, failing to do so, this note shall become forth-
with due and payable,
is now clearly permissible. However, two caveats should be observed.
First, the term "subject to any acceleration," as used in section 3-109,
should not be taken at full face value; and second, the power to require
additional collateral given in section 3-112 should not be considered
absolute. As previously mentioned, section 1-208 provides that such
powers to accelerate and to require additional security must in all events
be exercised in good faith, but the burden of proving lack of good faith
lies with the one against whom the power is exercised.
Transfer and Negotiation
Reference has already been made to the new statutory approval
given to the word "assigns" as a word of negotiability.2 8 The same holds
good for the use of "assign" in the indorsement and transfer of an
instrument, as well as to words of "condition, waiver, guaranty, limitation
or disclaimer of liability."29  Section 3-202 provides that the use of such
words in an indorsement will not affect its character as an indorsement.
This constitutes a direct reversal of a principal Ohio case' in which the
transfer of notes was accompanied by such words as "we assign" and
"severally guarantee payment." In this case, the court of appeals held
the language to constitute a mere assignment with a guaranty of pay-
ment. Now, these words become words of indorsement and, by refer-
ence to section 3-416,31 actually add the liability of a guarantor to that
of an indorser.
25. OHIo REV. CODE § 1303.11.
26. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
27. OHIo REV. CODE § 1301.14.
28. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
29. OHIo REV. CODE § 1303.23, UCC § 3-202.
30. Carius v. Ohio Contract Purchase Co., 30 Ohio App. 57, 164 N.E. 234 (1928).
31. Omio REV. CODE § 1303.52.
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Also in the field of transfer, another important addition has been
made. Section 3-2072 provides for effective transfer to a holder in due
course by either an embezzler or a fiduciary exceeding his authority or
breaching his duty.
Holder in Due Course
An interesting change in concept appears in the definition of a holder
in due course. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, one
could only be a holder in due course if he took the paper before it was
overdue, and this rule was followed in Ohio case law. Now, however,
the rule has been changed by section 3-302,'3 which only requires that
a holder shall have received the instrument without notice that it is
overdue, or has been dishonored, or of any defense or claim against it.
Under the new rule, a purchaser like the one in the Harvard Mortgage
case, 4 who had taken after default but without notice, would become
a holder in due course.
The same section of the Code also dears up a question which has
long plagued the courts, to wit: whether a payee may become a holder
in due course. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law used the word
"negotiated" in describing the attributes of a holder, and from this the
courts had often come to the conclusion that a payee could only become
a holder, if at all, under circumstances where he had purchased the
paper from an intervening holder. Now, the rule is made dear that a
payee may be a holder in due course from the outset if he meets the
requirements of section 3-302, i.e., purchase for value, good faith, and
lack of notice of default, dishonor, or defense.
Another provision of section 3-302 is that a transferee of an instru-
ment does not become a holder in due course by purchasing it at a
judicial sale, or bulk sale, or from an estate. At first blush, this appears
to conform to the rule announced in Stowe v. Branigan35 to the effect that,
as to one whose title is derived by operation of law, "the doctrine of due
course is immaterial." However, the real question is whether one who
takes an instrument under these circumstances from another who is in
fact a holder in due course can succeed to such status, even though the
mode of transfer itself cannot confer such status. Reference to section
3-2013" will indicate that the Code confers on a transferee such rights as
the transferor had in the instrument. Viewed in this manner, the Code
appears to supersede the rule of the Stowe case, and hereafter a transferee
32. OHIO REv. CODE 5 1303.28.
33. Osno REv. CODE 5 1303.31.
34. Harvard Mortgage Co. v. Neeson, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 577 (Ct, App. 1928).
35. 7 Ohio L Abs. 7 (Ct. App. 1928).
36. Omo RiV. CODE § 1303.22.
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will possess the rights of a holder in due course if his transferor had such
status, despite his acquisition through a judicial sale, or bulk sale, or from
an estate.
A commonly encountered question is what sort of notice will destroy
the status of a holder in due course. One type of notice often called
into question deals with incompleteness and irregularity of the instru-
ment. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law a holder must
have taken an instrument which is "complete and regular" on its face.
The Code, however, reverses this approach in section 3-3 04 ," stating that
a purchaser only has notice of a claim or a defense if the instrument is so
incomplete, irregular, or the like, "as to call into question its validity,
terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay."
Thus, a check written in early January of a new year, in which the
figures denoting the date have been altered by lining out the numerals for
the previous year (as: +-6-) and writing above it the numerals for
the new year (as: 1962) would not seem to give notice of an irregu-
larity, since nearly everyone has difficulty writing the date of a new
year for the first several weeks. However, the same sort of a change
on the face of a check in the month of August could be said to give
notice of an irregularity. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law, though, both checks would be technically irregular and subject
to defenses for this reason.
Other matters relative to notice which will or will not destroy the
status of a holder in due course are set forth in section 3-304. One
of these, fixing a thirty-day rule as to the staleness of checks, is particu-
larly noteworthy, but will be discussed hereafter under the heading of
Banking Practice, since a complete understanding of its effect requires
reference to certain sections in article 4. It should be noted, however,
that section 3-304 also provides, inter alia, that one may be a holder in
due course despite knowledge of a default in interest, of a post-dating or
ante-dating of the instrument, of a default on another instrument not of
the same series, or of a completion of an incomplete instrument so long
as there is no notice of an improper completion. Most of these are new
law in Ohio and should be given close scrutiny for this reason.
Pleading and Proof Problems
The careful practitioner is always concerned with problems of plead-
ing and proof The Code assists in this respect by spelling out the most
significant matters relating to commercial paper rather clearly in section
37. Omio REV. CODE § 1303.33.
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3-307.38 For instance, unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each
signature is deemed to be admitted, thus requiring care that any possible
doubts as to the validity of or authority for a signature be immediately
put on record in the answer or other appropriate pleading, lest such
defense be forever lost. If the effectiveness or validity of a signature
has been put in issue, the burden of proof then rests with the one claim-
ing under it. However, this burden may be easily satisfied for the pur-
poses of a prima fade case, since there is a presumption of genuineness
and authorization except where the claim is against the estate of a de-
cedent or incompetent who became such before the proof was required.
In this way, though the burden of proof still rests with the claimant,
the burden of going forward almost always is shifted to the defender by
the mere introduction of the instrument into evidence. This seems to
be a sort of legal game of "now you see it, now you don't." However,
since the policy of the Code is to promote the free flow of commercial
paper, such requirements relating to pleading, evidence, and burden of
proof are designed to give the maximum reasonable protection to the
holder of such paper without destroying the rights of a defendant to
prove an actual fraud or invalidity. Viewed in this light, the rules seem
sensible and workable.
Signature Problems
Some of the principal changes in the law of commercial paper have
been made in the areas relating to liability of the parties. One of these
areas pertains to the manner of signing the instrument. Under the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, an agent became personally liable
unless, in signing the bill or note, he disclosed both his representative
capacity and his principal. Thus, if a note were signed: "Arresto Corpo-
ration, by James Finn, President," there was no problem. Unfortunately,
however, all businessmen are not so careful in observing legal niceties.
As a result, many problems of liability have arisen where instruments
were signed: "Arresto Corporation, by James Finn," or just "James Finn,
President," despite the fact that at the time of execution, all parties
concerned were well aware of the true nature of the agency and of the
identity of the principal. The Code, in section 3-403,a° disposes of some
of these problems by permitting the signer, in a suit between the
original parties, to prove the true nature of his agency signature if either
his representative capacity or the identity of the principal are revealed in
the form of signature. Of course, if the signature merely reads: "James
Finn," both the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Code
make the agent liable. To do otherwise would do violence to the well
38. Omo REv. CODE 5 1303.36.
39. Omo REv. CODE 5 1303.39.
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established parol evidence rule against varying the effect of written in-
struments. The Code's relaxation of the earlier rule does not do this, but
merely permits the introduction of a parol explanation of an obvious
ambiguity, and this only between the original parties who had reason
to know the true facts.
A signature problem which the Code has clarified is that presented
by an unauthorized signature resulting from the negligence of the maker
or drawer. This situation may arise either as an indorsement or as a sig-
nature used to issue the instrument. Previous statutory law in Ohio did
not cover this situation, but under the case law a maker was held liable
when he negligently misdirected a letter containing a check which there-
by fell into the hands of a man with a similar name who fraudulently
negotiated it." The Ohio court in this case held the drawer liable to the
bank, despite its having paid on a forged indorsement. In section
3-406,41 the Code adopts the rule of the Weisberger case in such form
as to broaden the scope of its coverage materially.
Under the new statutory rule, for instance, an employer using either
a signature stamp or an automatic signing device may dearly be held
liable for the results of carelessly making it available to employees who
thereafter use it for fraudulent purposes.
Corollary to this, and constituting a variation from existing Ohio
law, is the rule stated in section 3-404(1)42 whereby a purported signer
(either maker, drawer, drawee, or indorser) may ratify his forged signa-
ture. Formerly, a number of Ohio courts4" had held a forgery to be
totally void and not subject to ratification, this line of authorities com-
mencing even before the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law provision which was interpreted to support this view." This
rather extreme rule, however, had been somewhat softened in Ohio by
the qualification that the purported signer might be estopped to assert the
defense of forgery in the event that his actions or statements, or his fail-
ure to speak under circumstances inviting reliance, had contributed to
the payment of the instrument upon the forged signature.
40. S. Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Say. Bank Co., 84 Ohio St. 21, 95 NE. 379 (1911).
41. Omio REv. CODE § 1303.42.
42. OHio REv. CODE § 1303.40(B).
43. Shinew v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 Ohio St. 297, 95 N.E. 881 (1911); Workman v. Wright,
33 Ohio St. 405 (1878); Briggs v. Hutson, 27 Ohio App. 93, 160 N.E. 860, afj'd, 120 Ohio
St. 58, 165 N.E. 534 (1927); Fourth & Central Trust Co. v. Johnson, 24 Ohio App. 129,
156 N.E. 462 (1927).
44. See former Ohio Revised Code section 1301.25, 95 Ohio Laws 174 (1902), which,
like present Ohio Revised Code section 1303.40(B), declared forgeries to be "wholly inop-
erative," but which did not specifically sustain the conclusion of the cases mentioned in foot-
note 43 that a forgery cannot be ratified. The new language following the words "wholly
inoperative" states that "unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it," thus approving
both the existing Ohio qualification and the heretofore rejected principle of ratification of a
forgery.
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Two other signature problems are given much more sensible treat-
ment under the Code than previously, namely, the cases of instruments
made payable to impostors and instruments made payable to fictitious
payees. Under the former Ohio cases, banks had often been held liable
for paying on forgeries under circumstances where the maker or drawer
was primarily at fault, either directly through being duped by an im-
postor, or vicariously by employing a dishonest payroll clerk, claim agent,
or similar person.
In the former instance, the courts, both in Ohio and elsewhere, had
evolved some rather esoteric theories to determine matters of liability,
all of which usually resulted in the bank's becoming liable despite the
original fault of the drawer of the check. These rules involved looking
into the mind of the drawer of the check to determine whether he really
intended the eventual recipient of funds to be the named payee, or
whether he had another person in mind. Naturally, when a loss occurred,
no drawer would admit that he ever intended an impostor or fictitious
payee to receive payment. This rule of intention of the drawer was first
developed in Ohio prior to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law45
and had been consistently followed since its adoption. 6 This use of a
sort of legal psycho-analysis is largely eliminated by the Code through
section 3-405 (1) (a) 4" which approaches the impostor situation by mak-
ing an indorsement in the name of the named payee effective if the in-
strument was issued to the impostor or his confederate in the name of
the payee. This would reverse the results in the Dodge and Armstrong
cases4" without a doubt and also probably the result in the Hockett
case.4" It is also noteworthy that section 3-405 refers to both mail and
face-to-face frauds, since many previous decisions had drawn a rather
tenuous distinction between them.
The other signature problem cleared up by section 3-405 relates to
instruments drawn payable to a fictitious payee whose fictitious character
was known to the individual directly responsible for preparing or order-
ing the instrument. The most common cases of this type usually involve
embezzlement schemes by payroll clerks who "pad" the payroll or by
45. Armstrong v. National Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N.E. 866 (1889); Dodge v. National
Exch. Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234 (1870).
46. Former Ohio Revised Code section 1301.11 (C), 95 Ohio Laws 171 (1902) made an
instrument payable to bearer when "payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person,
and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." The latter part of this clause,
requiring knowledge of the maker, permitted such decisions as Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 61 Ohio App. 217, 22 N.E.2d 517 (1938), and J. C. Hockett
Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohio App. 467, 87 N.E.2d 739 (1949), in both of which the court
held the bank liable under circumstances where either the drawer's agent acted fraudulently
or the drawer himself was careless.
47. OHIo REv. CODE § 1303Al (A) (1).
48. See note 45 supra.
49. See note 46 supra.
1962]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
claims adjusters who supply false claim data to the insurance company."°
Very often, these cases resulted in trying to determine whether the em-
ployee's knowledge of the fictitious nature of the payee should be im-
puted to the employer. Different rules were said to apply to situations
where a dishonest employee himself wrote the check or draft and where
he procured its execution by his employer. Under either circumstance,
the rules were confusing and unrealistic.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law treated paper drawn pay-
able to a fictitious payee as "bearer" paper. However, the Code ap-
proaches these problems by initially treating such paper as "order" paper
and by then proceeding to provide that any indorsement in the name of a
named payee shall be effective either if the person signing (such as the
payroll clerk or claim agent) intended the payee to have no interest in
the instrument or if an agent or employee of the maker has supplied the
name to the maker with such intention."n This approach is more direct
and certain than the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law approach,
placing the ultimate liability on the employer, rather than on the bank,
which can seldom protect itself adequately against clever embezzlement
schemes of customers' employees.
Acceptance and Payment
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law rule on acceptance of
checks and drafts has been changed by section 3-410.5" Under previous
law, three types of acceptance were valid: (1) that written on the
face of the instrument, (2) that written on a separate instrument, and
(3) that occurring through failure to return the draft within twenty-four
hours of receipt. The Code eliminates the latter two and recognizes only
a written acceptance on the face of the instrument. However, section
4-302"a does provide some modification on this as to bank drafts and
checks held without protest beyond the permitted period.
Moreover, the Code imposes liability for conversion on a drawee
either if he refuses to return the check or draft on demand or if he pays it
on a forged indorsement.54 This latter, pertaining to payment on a
forged indorsement is a reversal of the rule established in Elyria Savings
50. Note that the Hartford Accident case, supra note 46. is not a case of false claim data
and fictitious payees, since all claims were apparently bona fide, but drafts drawn by the com-
pany payable to real claimants, were appropriated and indorsed by a dishonest agent. Never-
theless, this situation also would appear to fall under the provisions of Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 1303.41 (A) (3), the same as the case of a fictitious claimant.
51. OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.41(A) (2)-(3), UCC 5 3-405(1) (b)-(c).
52. OHIo REV. CODE § 1303.46.
53. OHo REV. CODE § 1304.22.
54. OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.55, UCC § 3-419.
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& Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Company55 in which a recovery for con-
version against a drawee bank was denied. It should be noted, however,
that this rule applies only to forged indorsements, since payment on a
forged signature of a maker is treated differently, as will be seen.
It was inevitable that the new Code should give attention to the
long-established rule of Price v. Neal5" to the effect that, when the drawee
of a bill or check pays a holder in due course, the drawee cannot recover
his money upon discovery that the drawer's signature was forged. Al-
though the usual explanation of the reason for the rule is that the drawee
(usually a bank) should be presumed to know the drawer's signature, it
has often been put on the more realistic ground of the desirability of end-
ing commercial transactions at some point, final payment being deemed
as good a place as any. For some unaccountable reason, this rule was
never fully included in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, al-
though the net effect of one of its provisions on acceptance is substantially
the same."7 Nevertheless, Ohio courts had accepted the rule of Price v.
Neal as law and had even gone so far as to hold that the Uniform Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law in fact adopted it.5" Now, by section 3-418,59
the rule is dearly a part of Ohio law, not only as to payment on forged
signatures but also for other purposes (such as payment on an overdraft),
and its benefits are extended not only to a holder in due course but also
to one who has changed his position in reliance on the payment.
Two exceptions to the rule must be noted, however, which limit its
otherwise broad effect: (1) section 4-301" which gives banks certain
rights of revocation before their midnight deadline, and (2) section
3-417 "1 which creates a set of warranties which are given by a holder at
the time of presentment for payment. These warranties provided in the
latter section are substantially that (1) the presenter has good title or
is authorized to receive payment for one who has; (2) the presenter has
no knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized; and (3) the
instrument has not been materially altered. Subject to these exceptions,
then, a drawee bank is precluded from revoking its acceptance or payment
of an overdraft, forgery, or otherwise improper check or draft.
55. 92 Ohio St. 406, 11N XE. 147 (1915).
56. 3 Burr. 1354, 96 Eng. Rep. 221 (KB. 1762).
57. See former Ohio Revised Code section 1301.64, 95 Ohio Laws 178 (1902), which states
that acceptance admits the genuineness of the drawer's signature and constitutes an agreement
to pay according to the tenor of the acceptance.
58. First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 Ohio St. 207, 50 N.E. 723 (1898); Ellis v.
Ohio Life Ins. & T. Co., 4 Ohio St. 628 (1855); Commerce-Guardian Bank v. Toledo Trust
Co., 60 Ohio App. 337, 21 N.E.2d 173 (1938).
59. OHio RLv. CODE § 1303.54.
60. OHIo REv. CODE § 1304.21.
61. Onto REV. CODE 9 1303.53.
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Presentment
Turning to presentment, the Code has simplified and clarified the
rules in a number of ways. As to demand instruments, such as bank
checks, the Code specifies that they must be presented within a reasonable
time, and section 3-503 " spells out such "reasonable time" for un-
certified checks as being thirty days with respect to the maker's liability
and seven days with respect to an indorser's. Although this will be fur-
ther treated in the discussion of banking practice under article 4, let it
suffice to say that this makes it necessary that a check be presented with-
in thirty days after its date or issue, whichever is later, in order to assure
the drawer's full liability, and within seven days of its first negotiation in
order to assure liability of all indorsers.
However, although failure to make timely presentment will discharge
the liability of indorsers under section 3-502,"a it only works a discharge
of a drawer or acceptor to the extent of the actual loss which may have
been occasioned by insolvency of a drawee bank during the period of
delay.
As a sidelight to these statutory time limits for presentment of checks
and drafts, it is interesting to note that section 3-5084 allows a bank a dif-
ferent, and shorter, time for giving notice of dishonor than that allowed
to other parties. The bank must give notice before its midnight dead-
line, that is, midnight of the day following dishonor or receipt of the
instrument or of notice of its dishonor, whichever is later."5 Other
parties, however, are given until midnight of the third business day fol-
lowing such dishonor or receipt of notice of dishonor. This amounts to a
substantial change in the former statutory law" and should be studied
carefully for its effects in numerous situations. It would seem that the
rationale of this distinction is probably a recognition of the fact that the
public in general should be held to a less strict rule than banks, whose
personnel would be deemed to constitute the "professionals" among those
handling commercial paper.
Discharge
The last few sections of major importance in article 3 deal with the
subject of discharge. Section 3-6017 lists twelve separate methods of
discharging parties to an instrument, yet nowhere in this section is there
62. OHIO REV. CoDE 5 1303.58.
63. OHio REV. CoDE 5 1303.57.
64. OHio Rrv. CODE 5 1303.63.
65. OHIo REV. CODE § 1304.01(A) (8), UCC § 4-104(1) (h).
66. See the following sections of the former law in order to appraise the effect of this rule:
OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1303.17-.19, 1303.22, 95 Ohio Laws 184 (1902).
67. OHIO REv. CODE § 1303.67.
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reference to a means of discharge of the instrument itself, as provided
under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. To the contrary, the
Code treats discharge as a personal matter, depending on the respective
circumstances as to each party. Thus, in order to accomplish discharge
of the instrument itself, it is now necessary to secure conditions which
work the separate discharge of each party to the instrument. This may,
however, be simultaneously accomplished by reacquisition of the instru-
ment by any party who has no right of action or recourse on the instru-
ment, or by discharge of such party.
Section 3-603"s eliminates the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
concept of "payment in due course" and substitutes for it a provision per-
mitting any party to secure his own discharge from liability to the extent
that he pays or satisfies the current holder, even though such payment is
made with knowledge of another party's claim to the instrument. How-
ever, in the event that, prior to payment, such claimant supplies indem-
nity sufficient to the one making payment, or enjoins payment in an
action against the holder, no discharge may be secured through such pay-
ment. In the absence of indemnification or injunction, the one seeking
discharge is at liberty to choose whether to pay the holder or await suit
by the holder or claimant before making his tender.
Finally, under the provisions of section 3-606,69 a holder works a dis-
charge of a party to the extent that, without that party's consent, he re-
leases or agrees not to sue, or suspends the right of enforcement against
any person against whom such party had a right of recourse. Similarly,
such party will have a pro tanto discharge if, without notice, the holder
unjustifiably impairs collateral given by or on behalf of him or any per-
son against whom he has a right of recourse. However, by express reser-
vation of rights against a party having a right of recourse, the holder can
preserve his rights against such party as well as the party's rights against
others.
Some additional matters relating to commercial paper will be treated
or referred to in the ensuing discussion of banking practice, since the
interrelation of these two articles makes total separation of their subject-
matter an impossibility.
BANKING PRAcTICE
The principal purpose of this portion of the article is to discuss a
number of the provisions of article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code
which affect commercial paper, as well as several other provisions which
the author considers to be of particular interest to Ohio lawyers. Where-
68. OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.69.
69. Omo REV. CODE § 1303.72.
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as the discussion of "Commercial Paper" was substantial, though some-
what less than complete, the coverage of article 4, which is officially
designated "Bank Deposits and Collections," will be considerably more
limited.
It should be noted at the outset that, unlike the preceding two articles
of the Code covering sales and commercial paper, article 4 does not sup-
plant any extensive codification of banking law or any uniform law for-
merly in effect in Ohio. There were less than a dozen sections of the
Ohio Revised Code which were affected by the new law, and their cover-
age was extremely limited in effect. Hence, most of article 4 constitutes
new statutory law in this state, even though a large part of it was already
followed in practice as a result of court decisions, Federal Reserve regula-
tions and their accompanying law, banking customs and practice, and
other rules of procedure, both written and unwritten.
General Principles
Two points with respect to interpretation should be briefly referred
to. First, section 4-102(1)7o provides that wherever any conflict may
appear between provisions of articles 3 and 4, article 4 shall govern, and
wherever conflicts may occur between articles 4 and 8, article 8 shall
govern. Obviously, since banks act as makers, payees, and drawees of
many negotiable instruments of all types, whether notes, checks, drafts,
certificates of deposit, or otherwise, it is only natural that occasions should
arise where banking practice may run contrary to general commercial
practice as codified in article 3. Applying the accepted rule that the
particular should govern the general in statutory construction, the draft-
ing committee gives precedence to article 4 where commercial papers
affect bank deposits or collections. By the same token, but with opposite
result, precedence is given to the particular treatment of article 8 as to
investment securities being collected by banks over the general treatment
of bank collections contained in article 3.
The other point related to interpretation concerns itself with conflict
of laws in two respects. Section 1-105"' states the general rule of con-
flicts of laws under the Code to the effect that where states other than
Ohio, or foreign nations, are involved in a transaction, the parties may
agree on the applicable law, but failing to do so, the Code (in this case
the provisions of article 4) shall govern transactions "bearing an ap-
propriate relation to this state." Further, section 4-102 (2)72 states that
the liability of a bank on matters relating to presentment, payment, or
70. OHiO REV. CODE § 1304.02(A).
71. OHiO REV. CODE § 1301.05.
72. OHIo REV. CODE § 1304.02 (B).
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collection shall be determined "by the law of the place where the bank
is located."
Obviously, numerous problems of varying liability might arise with
respect to Ohio checks presented to out-of-state banks and vice versa, as
well as out-of-state checks bound for out-of-state payee banks, but dear-
ing through Ohio banks. Fortunately, many of these problems are about
to be solved through the recent adoption of the Code in Michigan and
Illinois, which, together with Pennsylvania and Kentucky, which already
have the Code in effect, give substantial Code coverage to most of Ohio's
near neighbors where a large volume of this state's interstate trading takes
place. Further successful efforts to secure adoption of the Code in other
states should be expected and should greatly reduce the importance of
these provisions.
Branch Banks and Cut-off Hours
Section 4-10671 provides a novel rule to the effect that a branch or
separate office of a bank shall be considered a separate bank for the pur-
pose of computing time and determining the place for action to be taken
or notice or orders to be given under the requirements of article 4. It
should be noted that Ohio courts have held that deposits made in a
branch are equivalent to deposits made at the main office74 and that a
bank with branches may be considered indivisible for certain purposes
and separate for other purposes."5 Thus, the full effect of section 4-106
on such decisions is not entirely dear, since it is not expressly contrary to
their basic rules, but may be in conflict in particular instances. In any
event, they must be kept in mind as possible limitations on its breadth of
effect.
It seems certain that this rule, although consistent with section 1 (A)
of the American Bankers Association Code, will occasionally produce
unusual and seemingly illogical results. For instance, it offers the possi-
bility of one branch charging an item to the account of the drawer
while another branch may treat the item as dishonored.78 Likewise,
while payment may have been stopped on a check drawn on one branch,
it is conceivable that section 4-106 would permit another branch to
claim the status of a holder in due course if it accepted the check with-
out notice of the stop order. 7
73. OHIO REv. GODE § 1304.04.
74. Provident Say. & Trust Co. v. Hildebrand, 49 Ohio App. 207, 196 N.E. 790 (1934);
Petrie v. Garfield Say. Bank Co., 8 Ohio App. 266 (1917).
75. Taft v. Guardian Trust Co., 17 Ohio L Abs. 54 (Cleve. Miunic. Ct. 1934).
76. See discussion in 2 ANDRSON, UNiFORM COMMmcIA CODE 25, comment 3 (1961).
77. See discussion in CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSrrS AND COLLECriONS 23,
(AL.I. 1959).
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Section 4-107 1 permits a bank to fix its own cut-off hour (but not
earlier than 2:00 p. In.) for the handling of money and items, so as to
allow time for accomplishing normal daily bookkeeping work, so that
all items or deposits received after that hour may be treated as having
been received at the opening of business on the following day. This is
only a liberalization of existing statutory law79 which permits items re-
ceived after business hours to be so treated, as well as an earlier court
decision approving a fixed hour for clearing books, even though the bank
may reopen for further business on the same day."°
The "Stale" Check Question
Now let us advert for a moment to the matter postponed under
article 3, to wit, "staleness" of checks. Section 3-304"' provides that a
purchaser of paper has notice that the instrument is overdue if he has
reason to know that he is taking a demand instrument after a reasonable
time since its issue. Up to this point, the rule is familiar, but then the
Code adds that a reasonable time for a check drawn and payable within
the United States and its territories is presumed to be thirty days. If not
fully understood, this provision could cause many sleepless nights for
bankers, since many banks of moderate size will clear from 100 to 250
such presumptively stale checks in a single day.
The first question then is: When does the 30-day period terminate,
when a check is first cashed, or when it is finally presented for pay-
ment? The answer to this seems to be the provision of section
3-5 03 (2)82 of the Code, which states that, as to the liability of a drawer,
the check must be presented for payment or its bank collection initiated
thirty days after date or issue, whichever is later.8 3
The second question to be considered is: What is the status of a bank
receiving such check from its customer, i.e., is it or is it not a purchaser?
Section 4-2014 makes such a bank, in the absence of a clearly expressed
contrary intent, merely an agent or sub-agent for collection, thus indicat-
ing that a bank only becomes a purchaser by actually cashing a check or
taking it as payment, but not by receiving it on deposit. Hence, the
78. Oino REV. CODE § 1304.05.
79. OHIO REV. CODE § 1105.13 (A).
80. See Taft v. Guardian Trust Co., supra note 75.
81. OHIo REV. CODE § 1303.33.
82. OHIO REV. CODE § 1303.58.
83. As to the indorser's liability, a reasonable time is presumed to be seven days after his
indorsement. This requires that one receiving a check by indorsement commence bank col-
lection or present it for payment promptly after receipt, even though the payee may have a
longer period to initiate collection.
84. OHIO REV. CODE § 1304.07.
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area in which special care must be exercised is limited to transactions
where a check is unequivocally received in payment or is cashed, with-
out any reservations as to its ultimate collection.
However, two additional qualifications should be noted. First, sec-
tion 3-502,"' as already noted, limits the discharge of a drawer's liability
occasioned by late presentment by only so much as his actual loss re-
sulting from an intervening failure of the drawee bank. Second, section
4-404" impliedly authorizes a bank to honor a customer's check up to
six months after its date under all circumstances, and even thereafter
if done in good faith.
Losses by Correspondent Banks
Section 4-202(c)"7 presents a change in the existing Ohio rule re-
garding the liability of a collecting bank for the insolvency, neglect,
misconduct, and the like, of its correspondent banks handling an item in
process of collection. Ohio had formerly followed the so-called "New
York rule"" that the correspondent bank is the agent of the collecting or
depositary bank, but not of the depositor, thus making the collecting bank
primarily liable to its customer. The Code now adopts the "Massachu-
setts rule" instead, to the effect that a bank is not liable for the negli-
gence of its correspondents (at least so long as they are selected with
reasonable care).
Checks of Decedents and Incompetents
One final noteworthy item to Ohio practitioners and bankers is the
provisions of section 4-405,89 which substitute a far more sensible rule
than in the past with respect to outstanding checks of a deceased or in-
competent drawer. Under former case law, Ohio banks could not safely
cash outstanding checks of a decedent on the theory that death revoked
the agency to pay." The new rule permits payment of such checks by
the bank on which they are drawn until such time as the bank knows of
death or an adjudication of incompetency and has had reasonable oppor-
tunity to act on this knowledge. In addition, even with knowledge of
death (but not incompetency), the bank may continue to pay such
85. OMo REV. CODE 5 1303.57.
86. OMo REV. CODE 5 1304.27.
87. OHio REv. CODE 5 1304.08.
88. Bridge Co. v. Savings Bank, 46 Ohio St. 224, 20 NE. 339 (1889); Reeves v. State
Bank of Ohio, 8 Ohio St. 465 (1858); Fourth & Cen. Trust Co. v. Aker Bros., 39 Ohio
App. 247, 177 N.E. 602 (1931).
89. Omo REv. CODE § 1304.28.
90. Haefner v. First Nat'l Bank, 70 Ohio App. 293, 44 N.E.2d 489 (1942).
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checks for a period of ten days after death unless ordered to stop payment
by a person claiming an interest in the account.
The remaining provisions of article 4 contain either statements of
law not considered unusual or noteworthy or rules relating to bank pro-
cedures, warranties, and similar matters of a more specialized nature.
These should be studied carefully by bank counsel and banking per-
sonnel, but are of only passing interest to most lawyers.
